Campaign Overview * Campaign Timeline
“Jackson’s Valley Campaign”
Background
At the beginning of March 1862 the situation was tense for the Confederacy. Union Forces in the Western Theater had opened the Cumberland River and were advancing south. Union Forces were poised for a great offensive in the east. Major General George McClellan was about to transport his main Union army in the east down the Chesapeake Bay to strike at Richmond, while Major General Irvin McDowell would stike Richmond by land from the north. And Major General Nathaniel Banks was preparing to cross the Potomac and advance up the Shenandoah Valley. (The Shenandoah Valley rises in elevation as you move south, so moving south is moving up the Valley)
Confederate General Joseph Johnston’s Army of the Potomac, the main Confederate army in the east, was around Manassas Junction and Centreville. He was well aware of McClellan’s plans to outflank him by sea and was preparing to evacuate to the south to defend Richmond.
At Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley Major General Thomas Jackson, known as “Stonewall” due to his actions at the Battle of Manassas, commanded a tiny force of around 5,000 men. Most of them were militia. He had just finished the disappointing Romney Expedition. Suffering from intense cold and blizzard conditions that made roads a sheet of ice, Jackson had captured Romney but had failed to take Hancock, Maryland or free more of western Virginia from Union control. Worse yet,a subordinate that had been left in command of the garrison at Romney had gone over Jackson’s head to complain to the Confederate Secretary of War about his isolated and freezing men, resulting in Jackson being ordered to withdraw the garrison. Jackson promptly did so, and also promptly submitted his resignation.
With difficulty Jackson was talked into withdrawing his resignation and the subordinate was transferred away. But the damage was done. Union Forces had reoccupied Romney, erasing the only benefit of the campaign.
Now Jackson was preparing to withdraw from Winchester, too. He was greatly outnumbered by Banks. And when Johnston evacuated Manassas Junction Jackson’s flank would be wide open. The only advantage he had was that due to the southwest-to-northeast inclination of the Valley, the farther he withdrew, the farther away any pursuing Federals would be from Washington or Richmond.
Objectives
Throughout the campaign Jackson’s goal was to divert as many Union troops as possible away from the fighting around Richmond. With his small force – always inferior in numbers to the Federals – he had to rely on speed, misdirection, interior lines, and his knowledge of the terrain to outmaneuver and threaten the enemy. During the campaign the Confederate forces marched 646 miles in 48 days, earning them the nickname “Jackson’s foot cavalry.”
The Union objective was to neutralize Jackson. He had to be prevented from threatening the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, the vital Union supply and communications routes that crossed the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley. He had to be prevented from threatening a raid on Washington D.C. And it all needed to be done without diverting too many troops from McClellan’s main effort against Richmond. This last consideration was eventually thrown aside when Jackson proved himself to be much more dangerous than anticipated, and more and more Union Forces were diverted away from the advances against Richmond..
Confederate Forces
Jackson’s Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia started the campaign with a tiny force of 5,000 men: two brigades of militia, the veteran Stonewall Brigade that Jackson had led at Manassas, and an oversized regiment of cavalry that was more a loose collection of individual companies. During March two brigades of Virginia troops replaced the militia.
In May Jackson was reinforced by Major General Richard Ewell’s division of four infantry brigades and a small brigade of cavalry. By late May Jackson commanded his own and Ewell’s Divisions which totalled seven infantry brigades and eight batteries of artillery, along with a cavalry brigade – about 17,000 men.
After the victories at Cross Keys and Front Royal Jackson requested an additional 20,000 reinforcements to take the offensive. He was sent two additional brigades of infantry, but was also ordered to join Lee around Richmond to help drive back McClellan.
Union Forces
In March Major General Nathaniel P. Banks commanded the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, which was concentrated around Harpers Ferry. It consisted of two infantry divisions under Brigadier Generals Alpheus Williams and James Shields and a sizable cavalry contingent under Brigadier General John P. Hatch. On the other side of the Alleghenies Major General William S. Rosecrans commanded the Mountain Department until he was replaced by Major General John Fremont on March 29. But after the Battle of Romney in January there was little threat to Jackson in the Shenandoah from the west.
On May 10 Lincoln decided Jackson, who had retreated to the southern part of the Valley, was no longer an important threat. He transferred Shield’s Division to the Department of the Rappahannock and ordered Banks to pull back to a defensive positions with his remaining division at Strasburg. Now Banks was down to less than 7,000 men, about half what Jackson could muster – and Jackson promptly attacked.
Washington quickly reversed itself. Shields’ Division was hurried back to the Shenandoah from the east, followed by reinforcements from McDowell’s Department of the Rappahannock. Major General John Fremont was ordered to move six brigades of infantry – about 11,000 men – into the Valley from the west. By the end of the campaign over 50,000 U.S. troops were trying to overwhelm Jackson’s 17,000 men.
Results
Nor only did the Union efforts fail, but the diversion of so many men from the fighting around Richmond may well have led to the failure of McClellan’s drive against Richmond. Many of these men had been intended to advance south from Fredericksburg on Richmond, covering McClellan’s right flank. Instead Lee was able to attack McClellan’s right flank, and was even able to bring Jackson from the Valley to add to his attack.
Jackson’s skillful use of speed and interior lines to tie up much larger enemy forces in the Shenandoah Valley was a major contribution to saving Richmond, and probably the Confederacy, in Spring of 1862. It was something the Lee would remember when he was facing a similar situation in 1864.