Front Royal – Monuments and Markers – 1862 Valley Campaign
On May 23, 1862 Confederate Major General Thomas Jackson attacked the Union outpost of Front Royal, Virginia with 3,000 men of his Army of the Valley. Front Royal was defended by 1,000 men under the command of Union Colonel John R. Kenly, whose First Maryland Infantry Regiment made up the majority of the garrison. Kenly was an outpost for Union Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, whose main force was fortifying Strasburg, about twelve miles to the northwest.
Background
Banks had crossed the Potomac into Virginia in early March, forcing the badly outnumbered Jackson to withdraw south from his base at Winchester. Banks had pursued up the Valley (the Shenandoah Valley rises in elevation as you head south, so moving south was spoken of as “up the Valley”) until lengthening supply lines started to become a problem. Lincoln assumed by then that Jackson was no threat. He ordered Banks to pull back to a defensive position at Strasburg and to transfer one of his divisions to Irvin McDowell to join the advance on Richmond. (see the 1862 Valley Campaign)
Objectives
The Union objective was to keep Confederate troops out of the northern part of the Shenandoah Valley. This would reduce the chance of raids against the important supply and communications routes of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, which ran across the extreme northern edge of the Valley. It would also protect against a raid on the Union supply center at Manassas Junction or even Washington D.C. This all had to be accomplished with a minimal amount of forces, as McClellan was calling for all possible reinforcements in his campaign against Richmond.
The Confederate objective was the opposite. Jackson’s orders were to prevent Banks’ men from leaving the Valley to reinforce the attack on Richmond, and to tie down and distract as many Union troops as possible.
Jackson’s Plan
Jackson was planning on returning north. But not down the main part of the Valley West of Massanutton Mountain where Banks thought he would go. Banks’ fortified position around Strasburg effectively closed that path like a cork in bottle. Instead Jackson would move down the Luray Valley, the narrower and less developed part of the Shenandoah Valley east of Massanutton Mountain. There was a Union garrison at Front Royal which served a similar function as the position at Strasburg, but Jackson felt that this force was much weaker and more vulnerable. And once Front Royal was taken, Jackson would be on the exposed flank of Banks’ main Union force, able to cut them off from communications with their rear.
The Forces
Banks had started out in March with a Corps of two divisions, but in May Washington ordered him to transfer one of his divisions and one brigade from his remaining division to the Department of the Rappahannock. This left him with two infantry brigades and some artillery and cavalry, about 8,500 men. Banks posted most of his men at Strasburg, with about 1,000 at Winchester and 1,100 at Front Royal.
The Union garrison at Front Royal was commanded by Colonel John R. Kenly and consisted of the First Maryland Infantry Regiment and a section of guns from Pennsylvania Independent Battery E commanded by Lieutenant Charles Atwell. Banks had not given Kenly any cavalry, leaving the outpost relatively blind.
Jackson, on the other hand, had been reinforced. His Army of the Valley District consisting of his own division of three infantry brigades and a strong cavalry regiment had been joined at the end of April by Ewell’s Division of four infantry brigades, the Maryland line (a Maryland infantry Regiment and artillery battery) and a small cavalry brigade. This gave him over 16,000 men, better than two to one odds over the Federals. This was the only time in the Valley Campaign that he was not outnumbered.
The Attack
Jackson was not aware of how much he outnumbered the Union forces, so he chose not to attack straight up the main Luray Road into Front Royal. Instead he made a flanking attack from the east on the Gooney Manor Road. Having learned that the Union garrison consisted of Maryland troops, he ordered his own Confederate First Maryland Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Bradley Johnson to move up from the rear of the column and lead the attack. They were supported by Major Roberdeau Wheat’s Louisiana Tigers, a total of around 450 attackers.
The attack started at around 2 p.m. It was a hot day, around 80 degrees. The Union troops were taken by surprise and driven from their camp on the south side of town. Many were captured in the confused fighting in the town, and a Union supply train was captured. It was a rare example of building to building street fighting during the Civil War, and a case of “brother against brother” with both sides consisting of Maryland men.
Colonel Kenly pulled his men back into a defensive line on Richardson Hill, between Front Royal and the South Fork river. The line was bolstered by the two 10 pounder Parrott rifles of Battery E, which covered the open meadow below the hill but could not be reached by the shorter ranged Confederate guns. Two companies of the 5th New York Cavalry Regiment arrived from Strasburg and joined the defenses.
Kenly was able to hold his position for two hours, but Confederate reinforcements were moving up. The 6th Louisiana Infantry Regiment attacked the Union left flank, and Confederate Artillery Chief Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield was able to bring up three guns which engaged in a duel with the Union pieces. Finally, the 2nd Virginia Cavalry Regiment and 6th Virginia Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Thomas Flournoy advanced on the bridges, threatening to cut off the Union line of retreat. Kenly decided that it was time to withdraw.
Retreat to Guard Hill
At around 4:30 p.m. Kenly set some of his supplies on fire, withdrew to the north across the bridges, and set them on fire. Sergeant William Taylor of Company H, 1st Maryland Infantry Regiment, earned the Medal of Honor here: “When a sergeant at Front Royal, Va., he was painfully wounded while obeying an order to burn a bridge, but, persevering in the attempt, he burned the bridge and prevented its use by the enemy.”
Kenly reformed his men on Guard Hill on the north side of the rivers. A detachment of around 100 men from the 29th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment that had been guarding the two bridges joined with Kenly, giving him around 800 men still in action. He was hoping to buy enough time that Banks would be able to withdraw from his exposed position at Strasburg.
A little before 6 p.m. a messenger from Front Royal reached Banks with news of the attack. But at first he believed it was nothing more than a cavalry raid and that Jackson’s infantry was still far to the south around New Market.
Pursuit Toward Winchester
By 6 p.m. Confederate cavalry had crossed at a ford and part of the 8th Louisiana Infantry Regiment were able to swim the river. The fire was put out on the North Fork bridge, and although it had partly collapsed infantry was still able to cross in single file. Kenly knew his position was hopeless and began another withdrawal down the turnpike towards Winchester. He was pursued by about 250 of Flournoy’s Confederate cavalry, who caught up to the Union force at a stone house known as “Fairville” about three miles north of the river.
Kenly deployed his artillery and ordered his New York cavalry to charge to buy time for his line to deploy. But the New Yorkers fled, with some of them shot by the disgusted infantry. Confederate cavalry then launched two charges, the first causing heavy losses to Company B of the 6th Virginia. But the second charge broke up the Union line before it could fully form. During the confused fighting Kenly was wounded several times and captured, and most of his men surrendered.
Aftermath
It was a complete victory for Jackson. Kenly’s force was destroyed. Union casualties were estimated to be between 800 and 900 men, with most of them being captured. They also lost the two Parrott rifles, although they were reportedly spiked before capture and then recovered when Jackson withdrew back up the Valley in the following week. Jackson also captured a number of wagons and a large amount of supplies. Confederate losses have been estimated at between 50-100 men.
After receiving conflicting reports on the battle Banks realized that Jackson was on his flank with a superior force and dangerously close to cutting off his line of retreat. He began his withdrawal the next morning, fighting off Jackson’s attacks at Middletown and Winchester before retreating all the way across the Potomac to Maryland.