The Crater • Tour the Battlefield • Battle Maps • The Armies • Petersburg Timeline
It may not have mattered who was in the lead in the first minutes after the mine exploded. The tower of flame, dirt and wreckage sent many of the first lines of Union attackers running away, while the rest had no desire to move forward. Worse, there had been no preparations for the troops to move across their own ditches and abatis. When their officers finally managed to get the men moving it was in small clumps without organization.
When they reached the crater rim the men stopped to stare. Many went in to help wounded and half-buried Confederates or out of curiosity. The lead brigade commander, Colonel Elisha Marshall, tried to take his men across. On the far side they found a confusing maze of trenches, covered ways and support positions, half buried in debris but still populated by armed opponents.
On each side of the crater Confederate defenders moved to contain the breach. To the north the survivors of the 17th South Carolina spread out to defend the maze of trenches. To the south Captain James Shedd, the only surviving officer of the 22nd South Carolina, barricaded the main trench.
Confederate Brigadier General Stephen Elliott arrived from his headquarters in the rear, gathered up as many of his scattered men as he could, and led them in a counterattack. He went down with the first volley and the attack was thrown back. But it was a sign that the defenders were still full of fight.
Colonel Fitz McMaster of the 17th South Carolina took command of the survivors of the brigade and formed two thin lines of skirmishers in the backup defenses west of the crater. For the next hour and a half these three hundred men were the only infantry between the Union attacking column and Petersburg.
But Confederate batteries to the rear of the crater swept the open ground above the maze of trenches. Five hundred yards north of the crater the gunners of Wright’s Battery covered the open slope leading from the Union lines to the crater. To the south Davidson’s Battery did the same. This crossfire made it deadly to move toward the crater – or to leave it.
Some Union forces began moving beyond the crater. Marshall and fellow brigade commander William Bartlett were able to lead some of their men into the nearby trenches. Some of Marshall’s Third Maryland fought their way over 300 yards into the maze.
At the same time Burnside’s two other veteran divisions assaulted the line on both sides of the crater. Potter’s two brigades were unable to attack the defenses head-on and either fell back or sidled south into the crater. But some of the men pushed on, and one regiment worked its way through the maze almost to Jerusalem Plank Road before the deadly fire swept them back to the crater.
To the south Wilcox’s two brigades also sidled toward the crater rather than advancing directly against the defenses. Some of his regiments stalled when they came up against the mass of men forming. Three Michigan regiments did force their way into the Confederate lines, but when the units around them withdrew they were left isolated and under fire from three sides.
By 6 a.m. three of Burnside’s divisions had become stalled in the maze around the crater or were disorganized in the pit. Wilcox sent back word that the troops were too crowded and Burnside should send no more men. But Meade was burning up the telegraph wires insisting more forces be moved up and the attack be pushed.
Confederates reinforcements were also on the way. Four miles from the explosion, Confederate Brigadier General William Mahone commanded the only reserves south of the James River. Around 6 a.m. he was ordered by General A.P. Hill to send two of his brigades to reinforce the defenders around the crater. Mahone decided to lead them himself.